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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. 
Case No. 19082 
IBRIAN ORTIZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a conviction of aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony, in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick presiding. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
DAVID WILKINSON 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Defendant-Apppellant 
321 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Phone: (801)322-5678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ED 
MAY 1 ;3 19811 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
IBRIAN ORTIZ, 
Case No 16566 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant appeals from a conviction of aggravated 
robbery entered in the Third District Court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty on February 15, 1983, 
following a two day jury trial. On March 4, 1983, he was 
sentenced to from five years to life in prison and a con-
secutive sentence of at least one year but not more than five 
for using a firearm to commit the offense. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
A reversal of the conviction and a new trial are sought. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on September 20, 1982, 
R1ch3rd Bullock was working at a gas station at 3900 South 
and Ninth East in Salt Lake County, (Transcript-9-10). 
Two men entered the business. One of the men pulled a gun 
and ordered him to lie on the floor (T-12-13). Money was ther. 
taken from the cash register (T-13). Bullock identified the 
men with the gun as one Leonardo Rayes (T-14) and the other 
man as the appellant (T-15). 
A second witness to the robbery 11as Becky Edwards, 
a woman who had just purchased some gas when it occurred 
(T-47). She too identified Rayes as one of the robbers (T-52: 
She also said the appellant was the other man (T-52), but 
that she had seem him only briefly (T-52), had really looked 
only at one of them (T-51), and had some questions as to her 
identification of the appellant (T-53). 
The appellant denied being with Rayes that evening 
specifically and denied ever spending time with him socially 
or otherwise in general (T-138) . He denied committing the 
robbery or going to the gas station (T-142). His defense 
was that he had spent the entire evening with a Pedro Revas 
and Santiago Crisbo (T-137, 139), including being questioned 
by an officer that evening (T-142). 
The officer who sto9ped them confirmed that the three 
were together after 9:00 and perhaps closer to 10:00 
or 10: 30 p .m. (T-118). However, the defenddnt was not perrn1:·· 
to put on further testimony to establish an alibi. 
The defendant's alibi notice identified 
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Crisbo as a witness and gave the Salt Lake County Jail as 
his address (T-126-127). It was filed one week in advance 
of trial but the Court felt it "was in compliance with the 
rule," (T-130). Unfortunately, Crisbo, who had apparently 
not been subpoenaed, was released from jail the same week 
the notice was filed (T-126). The appellant's counsel then 
learned that Pedro Revas was also in jail and on the Thursday 
preceding the Monday trial she asked the prosecutor if she 
could substitute Revas for Crisbo (T-127). The State objected 
(T-129) and the Court ruled that the notice as to Revas was 
inadequate (T-131) . Counsel for the defendant then stated 
that the failure to timely file the notice of alibi may have 
rendered her representation inadequate or incompetent (T-131, 
132). No corroboration of the defendant's version was presented 
and he was convicted. Present counsel was then appointed by 
this court to conclude the appeal. 
A R G U E M E N T 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING 
TO PERMIT AN ALIBI TO BE PRESENTED. 
The defense of alibi is governed by section 77-14-2, 
U.C.A. (1953, as amended), which requires a notice of alibi 
to be filed no less than ten days before trial. Subsection 
(3) of the present statute provides, "If a defendant or 
µrosccuting attorney fails to comply with the requirements 
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of this section, the court may exclude evidence offered to 
establish or rebut alibi." The use of the word "may" 
leaves the decision to exclude or admit alibi evidence to 
the discretion of the trial judge when the notice given is 
defective. In the present case the judge abused his discretio: 
by excluding the proffered evidence. 
State v. Anderson, 25 v. 2d 26, 474 P.2d 735 (1970), 
is apparently the sole case in wh".i.ch the failure to give the 
required notice was deemed to be sufficient reason to exclude 
the alibi testimony. The case is unique in that the defendant' 
attorney made absolutely no effort, even when coaxed by the 
trial court, to justify his failure. In three other cases 
involving the prosecution's failure to give the required 
statutory notice, this Court has consistently found "good 
cause" to waive the notice requirement where " . the 
defense is not so surprised and thus prejudiced when it has 
implied prior knowledge of the State's [alibi] rebuttal 
witnesses," State v. Haddenham, 585 P.2d 447, 448 (Utah 19781: 
State v. Case, 547 P.2d 221 (Utah 1976); Gentry v. Smith, 
600 P. 2d 1007 (Utah 1979). 
In the present case, the State could not have been 
"so surprised and thus prejudiced" by testimony of Reva" 
because it had "implied prior knowledge" of his existence 
the content of his testimony. The apµellant's defense was 
that he spent the entire evening in question with Cr1sbo and 
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Revas. The police officer's testimony established that the 
three were together at 10:00 p.m. The Court found the notice 
with respect to Crisbo to be adequate. All that the appellant 
proposed when he learned that Crisbo had been released but 
Revas was now incarcerated was to substitute Revas for Crisbo. 
It strains credulity to believe, considering the three purportedly 
spent the evening together, that Revas would somehow testify 
markedly different that Crisbo and the appellant, thus "surprising" 
the State. The appellant did not attempt to change the nature 
or content of his alibi, he merely proposed that the witness 
he originally intended to call be substituted for by another. 
The refusal to permit the substitution was an abuse of discretion. 
The prejudice caused to the appellant by the refusal to 
permit his witness to testify is manifest. The jury was left 
solely with the word of the defendant against two questionable 
identifications. It cannot be concluded that the refusal to 
permit him to present corroboration of his version was harmless 
error. 
POINT II 
INADEQUACY OF COUNSEL 
Aopellant's trial counsel questioned on the record 
and in her docketing statement whether she had rendered 
C'ffective assistance of counsel. Her concern must be examined 
aqainst the principles most recently reviewed in Codeinna v. 
660 P. 2d 1101 (Utah 1983). 
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The Court set forth three requirements when such a 
claim is made. First, the defendant must prove a demonstrable 
reality that counsel was inadequate. Second, the questioned 
area must not appear to be the product of a legitimate exerci" 
of trial tactics. Third, the deficiency in performance must 
be prejudicial. Id., at 1109. 
In the present case, tactics are not implicated in the 
failure to file a notice in the statutorily mandated time. 
Counsel missed the deadline and offered her own opinion that 
she was therefore inadequate. The prejudice the defendant 
suffered was in his inability to present corroboration of his 
alibi. 
CONCLUSION 
For either of the foregoing reasons a new trial 
should be granted. 
Dated this [C) day uf May, 1984. 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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